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Abstract
Without denying the importance of asymmetric information, this article
purports the view that credit rationing may also originate from a lender’s
inability to classify loan applicants in proper risk categories. This effect
is particularly strong when novel technologies are involved. Furthermore,
its relevance may increase with the importance assigned to internal rating
systems by the Basel accord.
This article presents a measure of the inadequacy of a lender’s classi-
fication criteria to the qualitative features of prospective borrowers. Even
without information asymmetries, credit rationing may occur if this quantity
reaches too high a value. Furthermore, some general principles are outlined,
that may be used by lenders in order to change their classification criteria.
Keywords: Credit Rationing, Risk Categories, Internal Rating Systems, De-
ciding not to Decide, Problem Decomposition.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that credit is not conceded to those applicants who offer the
highest interest rate. Rather, it is conceded to those who offer the most reliable
prospects that the debt will be repaid. Essentially, credit is rationed because by
increasing the interest rate banks would screen for riskier, less profitable projects
[35] [36] [58] [10]. Thus, economic theory sees credit rationing as an instance of
asymmetric information.
Interestingly, practitioners tend to stress another aspect. Giving for granted
that loan applicants typically hide some information, they are rather concerned
with the content of the information that they provide. Specifically, they are con-
cerned about the soundness of the projects that they should finance and the ability
of their proponents to carry them out. In the limit, one may mention a popular
guide for venture capitalists listing such things as a deprived childhood, an absent
father, a strong mother and a sense of guilt for having not lived up to parents’
expectations as the hallmarks of successful entrepreneurs [55].
Be these features relevant or not, the crucial issue is that practitioners want to
know whether potential borrowers know what they are doing. After discounting
for the fact that loan applicants portray a rosy picture of their enterprise, they want
to focus on the details of the projects they are asked to finance.
These details may be quite easy to specify if the project is presented by a well-
acquainted firm that is expanding on a stable technology. On the contrary, it may
be a very difficult task when money is demanded for an enterprise of a novel kind,
one that has never been undertaken before.
Investments often involve novel technologies, and possibly the creation of
novel institutions and consumption habits [39]. Being novel, no objective prob-
ability distribution of their success can be measured. Thus, even if information
asymmetries would not exist, banks officials would still have a hard time trying
to understand whether a potential borrower is a visionary business man or a mad
man.
Figure 1 illustrates my point with respect to the received theory. Information
asymmetries make for a cloud between loan applicants and the bank. The presence
of this cloud is a sufficient reason for screening applicants and rationing credit
rather than increasing the interest rate until demand equals supply. Thus, the
received theory makes credit rationing depend on the cloud in the middle of the
figure.
However, I am claiming that if technological or institutional innovations make






Figure 1: Information asymmetries make it difficult to establish one-to-one re-
lationships between classes of risk and interest rates (cloud in the middle of the
figure). Moreover, uncertainty makes it difficult to define classes of risk (cloud in
the left of the figure).
Even a bank disposing of the same information as the loan applicant may never-
theless feel unable to classify the proposed project in a class of risk. Consequently,
it may decide not to make any offer, for no value of the interest rate. Thus, pre-
cisely the most innovative firms may experience credit rationing to a larger extent
than the average. Without denying the importance of the cloud in the middle, the
cloud on the left of figure 1 plays a role as well.
Indeed, credit rationing has been found to be strongest when innovative tech-
nologies are involved [32] [3] [4]. In principle, it is the stock market with its
variety of investors that should be able to finance the most innovative enterprises
[1]. In practice, stock markets are oriented by rating agencies whose classification
criteria are so stiff that the most innovative firms are forced to hide their features
in order to be positively valued [64]. The problem is that both banks and financial
markets need some form of classification of investment projects, and since clas-
sification rests on past experience, innovative projects that do not fit conventional
wisdom have a hard time. Simply, bank officials do not lend money for projects
that they do not understand, and rating agencies do not do better.
Several economists have stressed that the inability to classify qualitatively
novel project is at least as important for credit rationing as information asym-
metries [19] [20] [52] [62] [9]. This issue has remained quite marginal hitherto,
but it may become paramount in a near future. In fact, the Bank of International
Settlements (BIS) is purporting a link between liquidity requirements and the risk-
iness of loans, and this link should be based on internal rating systems [7]. Thus,
the BIS is prompting banks to improve their rating systems and to compete for the
best classification procedures.
This article is a first attempt to model these processes and their possible dy-
3
namics. Section 2 reports on qualitative and quantitative empirical evidence on
internal ratings. Section 3 presents a model of credit rationing that combines
information asymmetries with lack of confidence in the rating system when inno-
vations appear. Section 4 explores the processes by which internal rating systems
may be adapted to a changing environment. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
The process of classifying loan applications into risk categories is the very core
of banking. Traditionally, it has been hidden by strict secrecy. However, since
a few years the Bank of International Settlements is searching ways for adapting
liquidity requirements to the riskiness of loan portfolios. Consequently, a certain
amount of empirical research has been carried out and some results have been
published.
According to these investigations, banks make use of categories for the projects
which they decide to finance (the so-called “pass-grades”) as well as for the
projects which they decide not to finance (the so-called “fail-grades”). Categories
for projects that are not financed are few in number. Categories for projects that
are financed are many more.
In this study, only categories for projects that are financed will be considered.
Several features of these categories are important in order to understand the impact
of innovation on credit rationing.
First, one may ask how far in the past the judgement is stretched. It is obvious
that classification is made depending on past performance, but in order to run a
model we may need to know whether it is a matter of months or decades.
A study by the Bank of International Settlements [6] collected the answer
“three years or more”, but only from a fraction of the thirty banks that were in-
terviewed. In a public declaration, an official of a large Italian bank spoke of
“three years” [30]. Indeed, a guide for practitioners recommends to focus on the
“previous few years” [17].
Secondly, one may want to know the number of risk categories employed by
banks. Several studies have shed light on this issue.
In 1995, English and Nelson collected data from 114 U.S. banks. They found
that 85% of them had a rating system and that the average number of risk cate-
gories ranged from 3.4 for smaller banks to 4.8 for larger banks [12] [24]. In 1997,
Treacy and Carey carried out a research among the 50 largest U.S. banks, finding
a number of risk categories ranging from 2 to the low 20s and an average of 3-4
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Figure 2: The distribution of the number of risk categories among thirty large
international banks. By courtesy of the c©Bank of International Settlements [6]
[59]. In 1998 Weber, Krahnen and Voßman interviewed the four largest German
banks found out numbers of risk categories ranging from 5 to 8 [61]. Similarly, De
Laurentis found out that the five largest Italian banks in the years 1996-98 were
using 6-7 classes of risk [40]. In 1999, the Bank of International Settlements on
a sample of over thirty banks, generally large and internationally diversified [6].
Finally, by interviewing three specialised German banks in 2001 Norden found
that the number of risk categories was 6, 9 and 14, respectively [47].
Figure 2 reports the distribution of the number of risk categories found by the
Bank of International Settlements. The number of risk categories ranges between
2 and 20. This, this range includes the numbers found by other studies.
In their empirical study of 1997, Treacy and Carey revisited older investiga-
tions as well. They came to the conclusion that a decade earlier the number of
risk categories might have been smaller, in the order of three if they were in place
at all [59]. They remarked that the number of risk categories increased both with
time and with the size of banks, but not indefinetly. According to their suggested
interpretation, this is due to a trade-off between the advantages of a large number
of categories for running automatized systems for detecting problem loans on the
one hand, and the difficulties posed by large number of categories to boundedly
rational decision-makers on the other hand.
Notably, banks that are using a very large number of categories generally de-
rived them by adding a “+” or “-” to a smaller set of categories. For instance, a
system with 6 categories can be easily turned into a system of 12 categories by
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requiring bank officials to qualify their judgement specifying whether the loan is
in the upper end of the category (with a “+”) or in the lower one (with a “-”). By
doing so, human operators can approach the classification problem in two steps
[59].
Finally, it is very important to know the criteria by which loan applications are
classified. In particular, this is important in order to formulate guidelines along
which the classification criteria may be changed with time.
According to several empirical studies, it appears that both “hard” and “soft”
aspects are considered by banks, though this distinction is blurred by the fact that
even “soft” aspects are translated into numerical values [13] [6] [31]. A possible
list of the aspects involved may be the following:
1. Loan specification in terms of collaterals and terms of payment [11] [40]
[6] [48]. In particular, securities are a condition for evaluating other aspects
[17].
2. Financial indicators [61] [40] [6], eventually used by automatized proce-
dures such as the Z-score [2] or neural networks [37]. For venture capital-
ists, the liquidity of assets is also important [45].
3. The technology employed by the project, to be evaluated with respect to
the industries on which it is expected to impact [43] [61]. In particular,
marginal firms in mature sectors are often sources of financial distress [17].
In contrast, proprietary or otherwise protected technologies and products
are positively valued [45].
4. Psychological features of the applying entrepreneur and quality of the man-
agement team, to be considered in conjunction with the structure of the
industry where the applicant operates [8] [53] [43] [61] [6]. Management
quality may be inferred by the absence of litigations, suppliers satisfaction
and managers succession plans [17]. In high-tech start-ups, the willing-
ness of scientists to give up managing positions to professional managers is
highly valued [5].
5. Reliability of the information provided by the applicant. Reliability is in-
creased by a lasting acquaintance [23] [40] but may eventually be disrupted
by signals of increasing information asymmetries such as changes of ac-
counting procedures or a growing reluctance to provide information [18].
Long-term relations have been found to integrate, not to substitute for col-
laterals [48].
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6. Information provided by the stock market and its rating agencies, or by
customers and suppliers of the applicant [11] [40] [6]. For firms with over
25% of operations abroad, the country risk evaluated by rating agencies may
be included [17].
It has been observed that several banks are shifting from rating systems based
on one single set of categories to rating systems based on several sets of categories,
each for a different aspect of a loan application. The most common distinction is
between aspects that pertain to the applicant (issues 2, 4 and 5 above) and aspects
that pertain to the particular project for which a loan is requested (issues 1, 3 and 6
above) [59] [6] [40]. However, it appears that some banks are moving even further,
evaluating several or all of the above aspects separately or, in some cases, even
subdividing them further according to their components [61]. By having different
bank officials specialised in one or a few aspects of rating, a bank is better able
to detect warning signs that involve only one aspect. Subsequently, a thorough
examination of all the aspects of a loan may be started [40].
This suggests that the number of aspects that are considered separately has a
huge impact on lending decisions. The more aspects are considered separately, the
easier it is for a bank to detect problem loans. However, too subtle categories may
impair the evaluation of innovative projects that cut across the borders of existing
categories.
In § 4 we shall examine the consequences of having multiple aspects to be
considered in separate sets of categories. In the ensuing § 3, credit rationing is
examined in the simple case of one single set of risk categories, ordered from “low
risk” to “high risk”. In this simple setting, which is still a realistic description of
the functioning of many banks, each category refers to a different class of risk
though each category encompasses all of the above aspects.
3 Classification Failure
This section illustrates a procedure for modelling credit rationing due to a bank’s
inability to classify the qualitative features of loan applications in proper cate-
gories. Since credit rationing due to classification failure will be espoused in
conjunction with credit rationing due to asymmetric information, the basic for-
malisation by Stiglitz and Weiss [58] will be briefly recalled.
Their starting point is that, by increasing the interest rate, the least risky loans













Figure 3: The return on lending as a function of the interest rate. If projects belong
to n classes of risk, this function is not monotonic.
applications by means of the interest rate. Rather, they should segment the mar-
ket classifying loan applications in a discrete number of classes of risk. To each
class of risk, a different interest rate applies. Figure 3, freely adapted from [58],
explains this concept.
For interest rates r < r1, all projects are proposed to the bank. Thus, by in-
creasing r ∈ (0,r1) the bank makes higher profits. However, for r ≥ r1 the least
risky projects are no longer proposed. Thus, at r = r1 the expected return to the
bank drops. It increases again with r for r1 ≤ r < r2, to drop again at r = r2
and so on up to rn. Thus, it is convenient for the bank to segment the market by
classifying loan applicants into n classes of risk applying a different interest rate
each.
The highest interest rate, rn, does not necessarily coincide with the interest
rate that would obtain by equating demand and supply. In fact, if the bank fears
that the market equilibrium interest rate would only attract swindlers, it may not
concede any loan at that rate. Thus in general it is rn ≤ r∗, where r∗ is the interest
rate that obtains at market equilibrium.
Since r1 < r2 < .. . < rn, for ∀i < n it is ri < r∗. Thus, at least to the applicants
borrowing at ri < rn credit is rationed.
Credit is allocated by classifying the projects waiting for a loan into n cate-
gories R1,R2, . . .Rn ordered by increasing risk. To each risk category corresponds
a different interest rate r1,r2, . . .rn, where r1 < r2 < .. . < rn. Thus, a decision











Figure 4: When risk categories work properly, to each risk category corresponds
a different interest rate.
Figure 4 illustrates these one-to-one correspondences between classes of risk
and interest rates. The arrows indicate that being classified in a particular class of
risk implies that the loan applicant is offered the corresponding interest rate.
My point is that, if technological innovations change the features of projects
in ways that are not well understood by a bank, classification in a class of risk
may be impossible. Thus, a bank may suspend credit until the risks and prospects
of the proposed investment projects have become clear.
Innovations may be such that investment projects financed with great confi-
dence end up with failures. For instance, investments by the industry of photo-
graphic films may be ruined by digital cameras, or investments in oil extraction
may be ruined by wars and revolutions. Such occurrences call for refinements of
the classification criteria. For instance, one may want narrow the scope of low-risk
projects to exclude the construction of plants for the production of photographic
films.
Likewise, projects of novel kinds may become very profitable so the category
of low-risk projects should be redesigned. For instance, the category of low-risk
projects may be adjusted to include investments in the production of digital cam-
eras.
If innovations decrease the profitability of projects that used to be safe, than
the bank observes a causal link from a class of (previously) low risk to a high
interest rate. Conversely, to the extent that innovations opened up new fields the
bank observes a causal link from a class of (previously) high risk to a low interest
rate. In both cases, the one-to-one connections of figure 4 becomes the one-to-
many connections of figure 5.










Figure 5: If innovations are such that some projects obtain very different returns
from those expected, then the causal relationships from classes of risk to interest
rates become one-to-many.
another one. For instance, it may observe that defaults on investments related to
photographic films are occurring more often than expected.
The cross-connections of figure 5 warn that projects have been classified in
the wrong risk categories. If the capabilities of bank officials did not change with
time, this is a signal that the features of the projects did. Thus, the criteria by
which projects are classified should be changed as well.
The classification criteria should be adapted to the innovations that have taken
place by including technological and institutional details that had been ignored
hitherto. For instance, the class of low-risk projects may now include those based
on digital cameras whereas projects based on photosensitive film technology may
be downgraded to very risky, though the producers of X-ray photosensitive films
may need to be included in still another risk category.
Eventually, the revised classification criteria may achieve the goal of turning
back the connections between the Ris and the ris into a one-to-one mapping as in
figure 4. Subsequently, other innovations may turn it again into a one-to-many
mapping as in figure 5, and so on with every new innovation.
During the time periods when there are one-to-many connections between
classes of risk and interest rates, a bank is unable to assign a project to a class
of risk. Therefore, it may not concede credit altogether.
Since in our case this decision depends on detecting novelties, it must be based
on a restricted number of very recent observations. Let m ∈N denote the number
of past time intervals upon which bank officers evaluate the appropriateness of
their causal map. For brevity, m will be called the memory of bank officers. It is
obviously m ≥ 0, with m = 0 in the special case when bank officers look only at
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present-day occurrences.
Let us define the complexity of the decision-making problem as a measure of
the extent to which the connections that occurred in the last m time intervals are
intertwined [27]. The ensuing account is an excerpt of more technical publications
[15], [25], [26].
The structure of connections between classes of risk and interest rates can
be usefully subsumed by means of a simplicial complex. This is composed by
connected simplices, each for each class of risk. The vertices of each simplex are
the interest rates to which a particular class of risk is connected.
If the connections between classes of risk and interest rates are one-to-one as
in figure 4, simplices are isolated points so no simplicial complex exists. In this
case, complexity is zero.
On the contrary, if at least two simplices have at least one vertex in common,
a simplicial complex exists and complexity is greater than zero. For instance, the
connections of figure 5 corresponds to a simplicial complex made of n simplices
R1,R2, . . .Rn. The simplex R1 is a segment whose vertices are r1 and rn. The sim-
plex R2 is a segment whose vertices are r1 and r2. More intertwined connections
may be represented by simplicial complexes composed by many more simplices,
possibly of higher dimension.
Two simplices are connected if they have at least one common vertex. Two
simplices that have no common vertex may nonetheless be connected by a chain of
simplices having common vertices with one another. Let us say that simplices Ri ′
and Ri ′′ are q−connected if there exists a chain of simplices {Ru,Rv, . . .Rw} such
that q := min{li ′ u, luv, . . . lwi ′′}≥ 0, where lxy is the dimension of the common face
between Rx and Ry. In particular, two contiguous simplices are connected at level
q if they have a common face of dimension q.
Let us consider the common faces between simplices and let us focus on the
face of largest dimension and let Q denote the dimension of this face. It is Q ≤
n− 1, where Q = n− 1 means that there are at least two overlapping simplices
that include all possible vertices.
Let us partition the set of simplices that compose the simplicial complex ac-
cording to their connection level q. In general, for ∀ q there exist several classes
of simplices such that the simplices belonging to a class are connected at q. Let
us introduce a structure vector s whose q-th component sq denotes the number of
disjoint classes of simplices that are connected at level q. Since q = 0,1, . . .Q,
vector s has Q+1 rows.
In order to avoid repetitions in the calculus of complexity, a class of simplices
connected at level q is not considered to be connected at levels q−1, q−2, . . . 0
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as well. For instance, let simplices R1 and R2 be connected at level q = 2, and
let simplex R3 be connected with R2 at level q = 1. Then, {R1,R2} is a class of
simplices connected at q = 2 and {R1,R2,R3} is a class of simplices connected at
q = 1. However, {R1,R2} is not a class of simplices connected at level q = 0.
The following measure for the complexity of a simplicial complex has been
proposed by Casti [15] and improved by Fioretti [25], [26]:
C (F ; m,n) =
{
0 if all connections are one-to-one
∑Qq=0 q+1sq otherwise
(1)
where the sum extends only to the terms such that sq 6= 0. Finally, it is stipulated
that the complexity of two or more disconnected simplicial complexes is the sum
of their complexities.
The complexity seen by a bank official who is evaluating the reliability of an
attribution of classes of risk depends on the observed connections between classes
of risk and interest rates, which realise out of an unknown stochastic distribution
F . It also depends on m, the memory length, as well as on n, the number of classes
of risk. While F is unknown by the bank official, m and n are parameters under
her control.
Expression 1 takes account of two opposite effects. On the one hand, the
numerator increases with the number of connections between classes of risk and
interest rates. Thus, it simply measures the extent to which novel connections con-
fuse the causal map. On the other hand, the denominator of 1 makes complexity
decrease if cross-connections are separated in distinct groups.
Complexity 1 increases monotonically with both m and n. On the contrary, its
dependence on F is more interesting.
Let us consider the simple case where cross connections occur stochastically
as a fraction f of all connections. Thus, C(F ; m,n) becomes C( f ; m,n). Con-
sidering the empirical evidence of § 2, m = 3 and n = 10 appears an appropriate
choice. Figure 6 illustrates the ensuing values of complexity with f increasing
from 0 to 100% of total connections.
Figure 6 makes clear that complexity is different from “randomness”, “disor-
der” or any other property of the environment. Rather, it is a subjective evaluation.
Up to a fraction of cross-connections of about 35-40%, a bank official may judge
that the more disordered the connections, the more “complex” the environment.
Beyond this threshold, cross-connections are so many that the bank official may
judge that it is not worth to distinguish among projects whose returns are totally
unpredictable. Consequently, the business environment is less “complex” for her.
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Figure 6: Complexity as a function of f , with m = 3, n = 10. All values have been
averaged over 1,000,000 steps.
More precisely, complexity approaches n for very high values of f .
However, things change if cross-connections do not extend very far. Let us
assume that projects in a class of risk Ri may turn out to be appropriate to an
interest rate ri−ρ ≤ ri ≤ ri+ρ (r1 ≤ ri ≤ ri+ρ if i < ρ, ri−ρ ≤ ri ≤ rn if i > n−ρ).
The previous case obtains if ρ = n− 1. If ρ = 0 no cross-connections occur, so
complexity is zero. In all intermediate cases some cross-connections do occur, but
they are localised in a spot of radius ρ around each Ri.
Figure 7 illustrates simulations with ρ = 1,2, . . .9, all other parameters as in
figure 6. Cross-connections occur with increasing probability, but only within an
interval specified by the parameter ρ.
In figure 7 we see that if cross-connections are sufficiently localised, confusion
between causal attributions of interest rates to classes of risk never grows so large
that a decision-maker may give up the hope to improve classification criteria —
i.e. complexity never decreases. It reaches plateaus, however. These may suggest
bank officials to accept as unavoidable a certain level of imperfection of their
classification criteria.
Following Simon [57], let us think of bank officials as satisfycing decision-
makers who make a decision if a relevant variable exceeds a threshold. Since
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Figure 7: Complexity as a function of f , with m = 3, n = 10, for ρ = 1,2, . . .9.
With ρ = 9, the case of figure 6 obtains. All results have been averaged over
1,000,000 steps.
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complexity measures the unreliability of classification criteria as it is subjectively
evaluated by bank officials, it is sensible to assume that they may decide to revise
these criteria whenever C > C, where C is a proper threshold. So long C remains
greater than C, loans are not conceded, no matter which interest rate the applicant
is willing to pay.
The threshold C may depend on past experiences, market specificities and
institutional arrangements. It may change with time, though at a lower time scale
than C.
Eventually, the above description may be duplicated across markets or geo-
graphical area. For instance, a bank may carry out separate classifications of loan
applications in different industries or regions.
4 Revising the Classification Criteria
If complexity is greater than zero, bank officials set out to revise the criteria by
which they classify loan applications. If bank officials employ one single set of
risk categories R1,R2, . . .Rn, the process of revising the classification criteria is
largely carried out informally in their minds. Little can be said about it, either
because it is tacit knowledge or because explicit rules are eventually covered by
secrecy.
However, the empirical investigations reported in § 2 revealed that banks are
moving towards an arrangement of the classification process where different as-
pects are considered separately (financial indicators, management quality etc.).
Allegedly, the reason is that if one single aspect becomes problematic, a thorough
evaluation of all aspects of a loan is carried out.
Suppose that N aspects are considered, denoted by an index i = 1,2, . . . N.
The model expounded in § 3 can be applied to each separate aspect yielding N
complexity values C1,C2, . . .CN .
So long all Cis are zero (or below a pre-defined threshold), the classification
criteria are not doubted. A loan application may be classified in different classes
of risk for each different aspect, and the overall class of risk may result out of a
weighted average of the classes of risk in each aspect.
On the contrary, if ∃ i such that Ci > 0 (or above a pre-defined threshold)
the criteria of classification are doubted. Bank officials must make sense of the
observed empirical evidence by re-defining the classification criteria in such a
way that all mappings between classes of risk and interest rates are one-to-one,
i.e. all Cis are zero. Essentially, it is a matter of including issues that have become
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relevant while excluding others that are no longer so.
The collection of empirical testimonies reported in § 2 identified a maximum
of six broad aspects, depending in their turn on finer sub-aspects. For instance,
the aspect “financial indicators” may be broken down in a number of accounting
variables, and the same holds for technologies, management features and so on.
We shall say that each aspect can be broken down in several sub-aspects. If com-
plexity is greater than zero (or above a pre-defined threshold), bank officials may
need to re-distributed sub-aspects in order to change the content of the aspects that
generated too high a complexity.
An example is in order. No empirical evidence is available concerning the sub-
aspects employed by banks, but a good deal of information is available regarding
the classification criteria employed by venture capitalists. Although this is a very
particular case of money lending institution, its logic is not different from that of
a bank.
Let us consider the aspect that, in § 2, was labelled “The technology em-
ployed by the project, to be evaluated with respect to the industries on which it is
expected to impact”. From the main studies of the classification criteria employed
by venture capitalists [60] [41] [42] [38] [33] [29] [50] [46] [49] [16] [45], one
can excerpt that venture capitalists declare that the above aspect is composed by
the following sub-aspects:
1. The product is protected from imitation by the law or by its technical fea-
tures;
2. Uniqueness of product (the product has very imperfect substitutes);
3. The product has been developed up to the stage of a functioning prototype;
4. The product has a demonstrated market acceptance;
5. Availability of raw materials and stability of their price;
6. Easiness of procurement of specialised labour;
7. Availability of specialised equipment;
8. The venture will stimulate an existing market or create a new market;
9. This market has a high expected growth rate;
10. There is a well-developed distribution system;
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11. Favourable geographical location and good export potential.
There is quite a clear distinction between aspects 1 to 7, which pertain to the
product, and the aspects 8 to 11, pertain to its market. Thus, venture capitalists
generally decompose the aspect “The technology employed by the project, to be
evaluated with respect to the industries on which it is expected to impact” into two
aspects: “characteristics of product”, entailing sub-aspects 1 to 7, and ”character-
istics of market”, entailing sub-aspects 8 to 11. In other words, venture capitalists
have remarked that, in their fields of activity, technological considerations can
be safely decoupled from market considerations. In the terms of our model this
means that, in this case, by subdividing this aspect in two, the correspondence
between risk categories and interest rates in closer to be one-to-one in at least one
of the two derived aspects. Other money-lending institutions, in other contexts,
may find it useful to group aspects together; others still, may find it useful to
re-distribute sub-aspects among existing aspects.
The issue is that of arranging sub-aspects into aspects such that, while sub-
aspects are strongly related to one another within the aspect in which they are
included, aspects are largely independent of one another. Only if this can be
done, the aspects can be considered independently of one another when deciding
whether a loan can be conceded. It is an instance of problem decomposition [56]
[21] [22], where the problem of classifying loan applicants into proper classes
of risk can be eased if the features of the applicant can be considered separately
along nearly-independent aspects.
The properties of problem decomposition have been studied by means of sim-
ulations where a “problem”, consisting of a string of variables whose numerical
values had to be guessed, could be “solved” by mutating blocks of variables of
different lengths. While the string was such that it admitted an optimal decompo-
sition into blocks of a certain length, both shorter and longer lengths were tried
[28] [14] [44]. In the terms of our problem, this corresponds to having sub-aspects
that admit an optimal grouping into a certain number of aspects. Simulations al-
low give us a hint of what happens when the number of aspects is either smaller
or larger than the optimal one.
The results of these simulations may be summarised as follows:
• If the decomposition is coarser than the optimal decomposition, the optimal
solution is found later.
• If the decomposition is finer than the optimal decomposition, a sub-optimal
solution is found. However, during the initial trials the sub-optimal solution
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performs better than the optimal solution. Thus, the optimal solution may
be crowded out by sub-optimal solutions that perform better in the short run.
These results suggest that all attempts to discriminate among “aspects” in the
decision to grant a loan, as banks are doing since the last ten years (see § 2),
do not really aim at improving the quality of decision-making. Rather, the aim
is to be able to make a decision before rivals do. By distinguishing “aspects”
and considering them separately, a decision can be more easily made. If it is just
sufficiently good to ensure a positive profit, and sufficiently fast to be made before
the loan applicant applies to a competitor, then it is good to make it.
Other simulations on problem-solving were tried, where the optimal solution
was allowed to change with time [28] [14] [44]. In this setting, the problem-solver
must chase an optimal solution that escapes any attempt to be reached. In this
case, the simulations suggested that coarse decompositions perform better since,
by allowing for longer jumps in the space of solutions, they enable the problem-
solver to approach the optimal solution from time to time, albeit she may remain
far from it most of the times.
This result suggests that those credit institutions that are most often concerned
with financing innovative projects should not subdivide their judgement into a
large number of “aspects” and “sub-aspects”. However, we have seen in this sec-
tion that venture capitalists seem to do the opposite, i.e., they consider several
aspects, subdivide them into a large number of sub-aspects and are keen of ex-
plaining their classification criteria to researchers.
A possible explanation might be that what venture capitalists actually do, is
not what they think they do. Indeed, a stream of literature questions the results
obtained by simply asking venture capitalists what their classification criteria are.
Although the main aspects considered by venture capitalists are really those that
best indicate the future evolution of a business venture [51], too many aspects
decrease the judgement efficiency of venture capitalists [63] so in general they
actually employ just a few of the many aspects that they mention [54]. Indeed,
theoretical considerations suggest that it may be rational for a decision-maker to
ignore some information if this increases her likelihood to make mistakes [34].
In general, it appears that the processes actually used in order to change clas-
sification criteria are much more difficult to understand than the mere decision not
to grant a loan as soon as the categories in use prove not to be effective (see § 3).
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5 Conclusion
Credit rationing is one of those issues where the neoclassical model of competitive
markets does not apply. Similarly to other market failures, asymmetric informa-
tion has been suggested as an explanation.
Since asymmetric information is sufficient to justify the existence of credit
rationing, little effort has been devoted to alternative, or additional explanations.
Though a few economists voiced that uncertainty does play a role in credit ra-
tioning, this argument has not been pursued in either empirical or analytical terms.
The empirical evidence on credit rationing to high-tech firms is questioning
this approach, since there is no reason why information asymmetries should be
higher if sophisticated technologies are involved. Furthermore, the new accord
on capital requirements (Basel II) is emphasising the importance of bank internal
rating systems, a circumstance that triggered many interesting empirical investiga-
tions. Both streams of enquiry point to the cognitive difficulties posed by difficult
classification problems.
The modelling approach presented in this article is innovative, but admittedly
tentative and incomplete. Nevertheless, the author deems that it is worth to be
presented and discussed in the hope that more information will be disclosed to
researchers. The diffusion of computer-based procedures for evaluating loan ap-
plications is likely to increase both the need and the feasibility of scientific studies
on banks’s internal rating systems and the extent to which they influence credit ra-
tioning.
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